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Abstract:
US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. reshaped American free speech law 
through his Supreme Court opinions during World War I and after. This paper explores the oft-de-
bated questions of whether and how Holmes’s free speech views changed between his legal 
education (during which he was taught that the common law’s “bad tendency” test allowed gov-
ernments to punish any speech after it was uttered) and World War I (during which he created and 
developed the more expansive “clear and present danger” test). This paper argues that Holmes 
developed the underlying principles of his later free speech ideas in his writings on American 
common law, but that he only expressed those ideas in Supreme Court opinions after several other 
legal thinkers prodded him to do so. 
Introduction
A core principle of the American politi-cal system is the value of freedom of 
speech. As former Supreme Court Justice 
John Paul Stevens explained, “The First 
Amendment presupposes that the freedom 
to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect 
of individual liberty—and thus a good unto 
itself—but also is essential to the common 
quest for truth and the vitality of society 
as a whole.”1 However, freedom of speech 
was not always clearly defined and broadly 
protected in the United States. In the early 
20th century, the meaning of the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause was unsettled, 
and World War I threatened to submerge 
free speech under the waves of extreme 
patriotism. In two Supreme Court opinions 
in 1919, though, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. developed the “clear and present 
danger” test (which prohibited the Federal 
1 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of US, Inc., 466 
U.S. 485 (1984). Accessed from https://caselaw.find-
law.com/us-supreme-court/466/485.html.
Government from restricting anti-govern-
ment speech unless that speech created a 
serious, imminent danger of civil disobedi-
ence) for free speech, and thus began a string 
of cases spanning several decades in which 
the Court interpreted the free speech clause 
to cover more and more types of speech. The 
evidence suggests that Holmes developed the 
basic principles of his free speech viewpoints 
in his writings on American common law, 
and also that his clear and present danger 
test and emphasis on the importance of free 
speech did not emerge until 1919, after 
several young legal thinkers had encouraged 
him to change his thinking.
Scholarly Literature
Scholars have suggested at least three 
significant viewpoints about how and when 
Holmes developed his revolutionary doctrine 
of free speech. Scholars such as Fred D. 
Ragan have argued that Holmes’s primary 
change came in 1919 between his Schenck 
and Abrams opinions. According to Ragan, 
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Holmes originally used the clear and pres-
ent danger test to prohibit seditious libel, a 
common law crime of criticizing the gov-
ernment in a way that supposedly decreased 
peace or respect for the government. By the 
time of Abrams in 1919, he had changed the 
test to be the libertarian test that most people 
think of it as.2 A second view is that Holmes 
had changed his views before writing his 
Schenck opinion. One proponent of this per-
spective is David S. Bogen, who has argued 
that Holmes’s dissenting opinion in Abrams 
was primarily a clarification of viewpoints he 
had already begun to express in Schenck.3 A 
third view is that Holmes never changed at 
all, but developed his free speech viewpoints 
through his writings on common law liabil-
ity before he was ever appointed to the US 
Supreme Court. A proponent of this interpre-
tation is Sheldon M. Novick.4 Each of these 
three perspectives contains part of the truth, 
but taken together they provide a more com-
plete picture of how Holmes’s free speech 
ideas changed. Holmes’s judicial opinions 
show that he did change his opinion on free 
speech before Schenck, rejecting Black-
stone’s common law free speech doctrine in 
2 Fred D Ragan, “Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Dan-
ger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919,” The 
Journal of American History 58, no. 1 (1971): 25, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1890079. For a more recent 
example of this view, see Leslie Kendrick, “On Clear 
and Present Danger,” Notre Dame Law Review 94, 
no. 4 (April 2019): 1653-1670, https://heinonline.org/
HOL/P?h=hein.journals/tndl94&i=1701.
3 David Bogen, “The Free Speech Metamorphosis of 
Mr. Justice Holmes,” Hofstra Law Review 11, no. 1 
(January 1, 1982): 97-189, https://scholarlycommons.
law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/3.
4 Sheldon M. Novick, “The Unrevised Holmes and 
Freedom of Expression,” The Supreme Court Review 
1991 (1991): 303-390, https://heinonline.org/HOL/
P?h=hein.journals/suprev1991&i=307
favor of the “clear and present danger” test. 
However, Holmes had developed the core el-
ements of the clear and present danger test—
imminent danger and subjective intent—in 
his common law writings decades before 
Schenck, so the core elements of his new 
speech ideas came from his thinking about 
the common law. Finally, Holmes became 
an outspoken supporter of broad free speech 
rights after Abrams. Thus, each of these three 
scholarly perspectives contains part of the 
truth about the development of Holmes’s free 
speech thought.
Background: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
The most important advocate for free 
speech on the Supreme Court during the first 
few decades of the 20th century, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. was a product of his experi-
ence in the Civil War. A lieutenant and captain 
in the Union Army, Holmes fought in the 
crucial Battle of Antietam and was wound-
ed several times during the war, including a 
nearly fatal injury suffered at Ball’s Bluff.5 
The war exposed Holmes to Confederates 
who held different ideals from his, but seemed 
to fight for them with the same conviction. 
Looking back on the war in a Memorial Day 
speech in 1884, Holmes reflected: 
We equally believed that those who 
stood against us held just as sacred 
convictions that were the opposite of 
ours…You could not stand up day af-
ter day in those indecisive contests…
without getting at last something of 
the same brotherhood for the enemy 
that the north pole of a magnet has 
5 Stephen Budiansky, Oliver Wendell Holmes: A Life 
in War, Law, and Ideas, (First edition. New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2019), 85-90.
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for the south—each working in an 
opposite sense to the other, but each 
unable to get along without the other.6 
From his wartime experiences, Holmes 
concluded that dogmatic commitment to any 
belief was harmful and ultimately led believ-
ers to attempt to force their views on others.7 
At the same time, he felt that such conflict 
was inevitable and even appropriate. As one 
biographer explained, the war taught Holmes 
that, “Life is a struggle, and it is the struggle 
that gives it meaning. The only thing to do 
was to give one’s all, and leave the conse-
quences to fate.”8 This tension in Holmes’s 
thinking between the uncertainty of truth 
and the right to fight over it would later 
shape his ideas on free speech. As a Supreme 
Court justice, Holmes wrote to fellow judge 
Learned Hand in response to Hand’s sug-
gestion (in a previous letter) that uncertainty 
about many of our opinions should lead us 
to tolerate others’ views. Holmes wrote that 
he agreed, but added that “man’s destiny is 
to fight” over which ideas are correct, and 
continued, “If for any reason you did care 
enough you wouldn’t care a damn for the 
suggestion that you were acting on a provi-
sional hypothesis and might be wrong.”9 The 
6 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., “An address delivered 
for Memorial Day, May 30, 1884, at Keene, New 
Hampshire, before John Sedgwick, Post No. 4, Grand 
Army of the Republic,” quoted in Ronald K. L. 
Collins, The Fundamental Holmes: A Free Speech 
Chronicle and Reader, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 20.
7 Budiansky, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 130.
8 Budiansky, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 129.
9 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to Learned Hand, 
June 24, 1918, quoted in Thomas Healy, The Great 
Dissent: How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His 
Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in 
America, (First Edition. New York: Metropolitan 
Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2013), 24-25.
Civil War convinced Holmes of the value of 
both skepticism about truth and conflict over 
whose beliefs were accurate, both of which 
ideas influenced his later thinking on free-
dom of speech.
A second important influence on 
Holmes’s legal ideas was his training and 
expertise in American common law. Like 
any common law system, American com-
mon law was a body of legal principles that 
was always slowly growing as judges added 
greater nuance to it through their rulings and 
opinions.10 The common law system that 
dominated US legal institutions in Holmes’s 
day came from English jurist William Black-
stone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (a summary of English common 
law) had shaped American legal education 
in both universities and apprenticeship 
programs since the late 18th century.11 As 
a student at Harvard Law School, Holmes 
had read Blackstone’s Commentaries, which 
argued for a prior-restraint-focused concept 
of free speech.12 After law school, Holmes 
studied and applied the common law for 
about thirty-five years, first as an attorney, 
and later as a justice on the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court.13 In 1884, Holmes published 
a book entitled The Common Law, in which 
10 J. Lyn Entrikin, “The Death of Common Law,” 
42 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 351, 
(Spring, 2019). https://advance.lexis.com/api/docu-
ment?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:con-
tentItem:5WC3-T400-00CW-H0M2-00000-00&
context=1516831.
11 Dennis R. Nolan, “Sir William Blackstone and 
the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual 
Impact,” New York University Law Review 51, no. 5 
(November 1976): 761, 767.
12 Bogen, “The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. 
Justice Holmes,” 107-109.
13 Novick, “The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of 
Expression,” 305.
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he summarized his own thoughts on the com-
mon law. This book laid out an important test 
of civil liability: whether an ordinary person 
would have foreseen harm from a given 
action.14 In dealing with criminal attempts, 
in which a person attempts to commit a 
crime or comes close to committing it and 
then changes his mind, Holmes stated that 
the obvious tendency of an action (even if 
the action itself was not illegal) could make 
that conduct illegal if it was likely to cause a 
harmful result.15 In 1894, he expanded upon 
his ideas from The Common Law in an arti-
cle for the Harvard Law Review called “Priv-
ileges, Malice, and Intent,” which explained 
two ways by which a person could escape 
liability for harming someone else: just cause 
and privilege. In both cases, Holmes argued 
that the actor’s intent was the primary stan-
dard for determining whether the actor was 
in fact exempt from liability.16 Holmes would 
later use his common law ideas about crim-
inal attempts and the importance of intent 
to determine the constitutional limits of free 
speech for the Supreme Court.
The state of free speech law in the United 
States in the early 20th century provided a 
golden opportunity for the Supreme Court 
to reconsider the free speech clause of the 
First Amendment. The growth of govern-
ment and its power in the late nineteenth 
century had begun to unintentionally foster 
14 Novick, “The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of 
Expression,” 306-307.
15 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., G. Edward White, and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes , Sr., The Common Law, 
(Cambridge, United States: Harvard University Press, 
2009), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ku/detail.
action?docID=3300809, 61-63.
16 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Privilege, Malice, and 
Intent,” Harvard Law Review 8, no. 1 (1894): 5-12, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1322381.
the development of modern federal protec-
tions of free speech and other civil liberties.17 
This development occurred because modern 
nation-states like the United States Federal 
Government began to increase their power 
by directly engaging the individual. Through 
a sort of social contract, the Federal Govern-
ment offered citizenship and civil liberties 
protection in exchange for the individual’s 
support. This social contract made traditional 
political allegiances to non-governmental 
groups (such as churches and other civ-
ic-minded community groups) obsolete, as 
the individual was increasingly loyal to the 
Federal Government alone.18 Additionally, 
before World War I the Supreme Court had 
made few rulings on the meaning of the Bill 
of Rights. Other than slavery, the 1798 Alien 
and Sedition Act, and a few matters from the 
Civil War, the Court had rarely addressed 
civil liberties issues, including free speech.19 
A key reason for this omission was that the 
Supreme Court had not yet conclusively de-
clared the incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
against the states, meaning that states could 
pass speech laws at their own discretion 
without fear of federal intervention. Because 
no Supreme Court rulings clearly defined the 
constitutional limits of free speech, many 
courts relied upon the common law for 
guidance. The common law doctrine of free 
speech protection was based on prior re-
17 Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Her-
man Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins 
and Development, (7th ed. New York: Norton, 1991), 
509.
18 Christopher Joseph Nicodemus Capozzola, Uncle 
Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of 
the Modern American Citizen, (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008),7-8; Kelly et. all, The 
American Constitution, 510.
19 Kelly et. all, 510.
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straint, the idea that the Federal Government 
must allow everyone to speak freely, but may 
punish speech after the fact.20 William Black-
stone, the English jurist who helped codify 
English common law, was a key proponent 
of this “bad tendency” test. In his Commen-
taries on the Laws of England, Blackstone 
stated that freedom of speech meant that 
governments must allow people to say what-
ever they desired. According to Blackstone, 
however, governments could also punish 
such speech at their discretion once a person 
uttered an offending statement.21  Because of 
changing ideas of citizenship, a lack of civil 
liberties precedents, and the restrictiveness 
of the bad tendency test, the US Supreme 
Court found the opportunity to hand down 
groundbreaking free speech opinions in the 
early 20th century.
World War I, the immediate context for 
Holmes’s landmark Supreme Court opinions, 
was a key reason for the emergence of the 
new rights-oriented idea of citizenship. Tra-
ditionally, Americans viewed citizenship pri-
marily as an obligation to participate in var-
ious community- and nation-strengthening 
local organizations. This participation was 
not required but became a hallmark of true 
patriotism, leading to a form of peer pressure 
historian Christopher Capozzola has called 
“coercive voluntarism.”22 This culture of vol-
untary service for the national good pushed 
people to follow the Federal Government’s 
dictates or face ostracism and even criminal 
charges. However, the war also helped create 
a new definition of American citizenship to 
rival this traditional view. During the war, 
20 Kelly et. all, 511.
21 Bogen, “The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. 
Justice Holmes,” 101-102.
22 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 6-9.
the Federal Government attempted to control 
the personal lives of Americans at an un-
precedented level, threatening the traditional 
function of local organizations.23 Because the 
Federal Government emphasized obedience 
to national law during World War I, the war 
reshaped the American definition of obliga-
tion to country—from voluntarily contrib-
uting out of duty, to obeying the mandatory 
laws of an increasingly powerful federal 
government.24
The Selective Service Act of 1917, which 
instituted a draft of men aged twenty-one 
to thirty, sharpened the tensions between 
the old and new views of citizenship and 
further strengthened the new view.25 On one 
hand, the Federal Government could appeal 
to the obligation-based old view to support 
the draft. Draft cards allowed the Federal 
Government to both gain information about 
its citizens and change the terms of faithful 
citizenship to include registering for the 
draft.26 Because Americans now defined 
their citizenship largely in terms of the draft, 
the “slackers” who evaded the draft were 
considered unpatriotic, and the majority 
of Americans strongly condemned them.27 
Further, the Federal Government’s newfound 
power and federal law’s increased authority 
motivated dissidents to use federal institu-
tions (such as the federal court system and 
Congress) to get their viewpoints heard. For 
example, the American Civil Liberties Union 
was formed in 1920 as the renamed version 
of the Civil Liberties Bureau, a civil liberties 
interest group that advocated for the free 
23 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 7-8.
24 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 15.
25 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 21.
26 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 23
27 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 30.
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speech rights of minorities who opposed the 
war.28 Finally, in mid-1917, Congress passed 
the Espionage Act, which prohibited anyone 
from lying to impede the success of Ameri-
can war efforts, and enforced the prohibition 
with fines or imprisonment for offenders. 
The act also allowed the Postmaster General 
to remove from mail circulation any publica-
tion that advocated breaking a federal law.29 
The Sedition Act of 1918, passed on May 16, 
1918, amended the Espionage Act to further 
restrict free speech by making felonies of 
inciting mutiny among soldiers, discouraging 
military recruiting, or opposing the United 
States or its soldiers.30 These laws, along 
with the political climate in the United States 
at the time, proved to be the ideal circum-
stance for landmark free speech cases before 
the Supreme Court. 
Although the Supreme Court generally, 
and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in par-
ticular, had no history of broad free speech 
rulings, two Espionage Act cases marked the 
beginning of a new chapter in free speech 
jurisprudence. The first case, Schenck v. 
United States, dealt with whether the Espi-
onage Act’s banning of a circular published 
by a group of American Socialists (including 
Charles Schenck, the General Secretary of 
the American Socialist Party) was consti-
tutional under the 1st Amendment right to 
freedom of speech. Writing for a unanimous 
Court upholding the conviction of the Social-
ists, Holmes introduced the “clear and pres-
ent danger” test for determining whether the 
government could restrict speech. In his own 
words, “The question in every case is wheth-
er the words used are used in such circum-
28 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 515.
29 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 150-151.
30 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 513.
stances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent. It is a question of 
proximity and degree.” In applying this test 
in Schenck, Holmes recognized the rights 
of the defendants to say the things they said 
under other circumstances. However, wheth-
er a particular type of speech was protected 
depended on the circumstances surrounding 
it. During a war, the government had a right 
to restrict speech more than during peace 
time to prevent anyone from hindering the 
war effort. Since the clear intent—the only 
foreseeable effect—of the publication was 
to encourage people to obstruct the draft, 
Schenck and his colleagues had no right to 
publish the pamphlet.31 
The second wartime case was Abrams 
v. United States. Jacob Abrams and other 
American Communists were arrested for 
publishing two leaflets attacking the United 
States government and its efforts in World 
War I. The United States charged Abrams 
and his colleagues with attempting to con-
vince Americans to oppose US military ef-
forts.32 Using a variation of the bad tendency 
test, Justice John H. Clarke wrote for the ma-
jority that the purpose of the pamphlets was 
to incite sedition against the United States, 
and that prohibiting them was therefore 
constitutional.33 This time, Holmes dissent-
ed from the majority opinion. To determine 
whether the Sedition Act was constitutional, 
31 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
Accessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supreme-
court/text/249/47#writing-USSC_CR_0249_0047_
ZO
32 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Ac-
cessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/
text/250/616#writing-USSC_CR_0250_0616_ZD
33 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 514.
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Holmes repeated his clear and present danger 
test from Schenck as a two-pronged test. 
Unless the government could show either 
imminent danger to harm the government’s 
efforts or subjective intent to do so, the First 
Amendment prevented the government from 
restricting seditious speech. Holmes also 
included the following famous philosophical 
justification of free speech:
But when men have realized that time 
has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than 
they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas—that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out. That, at any 
rate, is the theory of our Constitution. 
It is an experiment, as all life is an 
experiment.34
Though Holmes was in the minority in 
this case, his free speech ideas would soon 
become the official doctrine of the Supreme 
Court.
Continuity: How Holmes Initially 
Developed His Free Speech Ideas
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. began to de-
velop the core elements of the clear and pres-
ent danger test – imminent danger and sub-
jective intent—in his common law writings. 
34 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
Accessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supreme-
court/text/250/616#writing-USSC_CR_0250_0616_
ZD
He began to develop “imminent danger” in 
his book The Common Law, published in 
1884. In The Common Law, Holmes argued 
that intent to commit a crime (as shown by 
actions close to committing it) was adequate 
to convict someone of criminal conduct. 
When he discussed criminal attempts (how 
the law dealt with people who attempted to 
commit a crime and were not successful), 
Holmes explained that intent and attempt are 
two different things. An intent in the mind to 
commit a crime is not criminal by itself; on 
the other hand, “If an act is done of which 
the natural and probable effect under the 
circumstances is the accomplishment of a 
substantive crime,” the actor is criminally li-
able.35 In general, therefore, Holmes believed 
that the perpetrators of a failed crime were 
still guilty under the law if their actions were 
likely to accomplish that crime. At the same 
time, Holmes recognized another category of 
criminal attempts: actions which are closely 
connected with criminal activity but are not 
criminal themselves. In these cases, Holmes 
explained that subjective intent to commit a 
crime was the key, since criminal intent de-
termined the likelihood that the actor would 
follow the legal conduct with other actions 
that were illegal.36 But what otherwise legal 
conduct shows criminal intent so dangerous 
that the conduct becomes illegal? Holmes 
answered as follows:
Public policy, that is to say, legisla-
tive considerations, are at the bottom 
of the matter; the considerations 
being, in this case, the nearness of 
the danger, the greatness of the harm, 
35 Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 61.
36 Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 64.
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and the degree of apprehension felt. 
When a man buys matches to fire 
a haystack, or starts on a journey 
meaning to murder at the end of it, 
there is still a considerable chance 
that he will change his mind before 
he comes  to the point. But when he 
has struck the match, or cocked and 
aimed the pistol, there is very little 
chance that he will not persist to the 
end, and the danger be comes so 
great that the law steps in.37
In summary, Holmes’s book The Common 
Law explored when the law could punish 
criminal attempts and offered imminent dan-
ger as the answer. Holmes would later apply 
this standard to constitutional free speech in 
both his Schenck and Abrams opinions.
In several judicial opinions, Holmes fur-
ther explained his ideas on criminal attempts. 
The first case was Commonwealth v. Lin-
coln B. Peaslee, a Massachusetts Supreme 
Court case in which a man set up explosives 
around a building with intent to burn down 
the building, destroy its goods, and injure its 
insurers.38 After setting up the explosives, 
the man drove to within a quarter mile of the 
building to light them, but then changed his 
mind and left. Holmes explained that ac-
tions in furtherance of a planned crime were 
not generally crimes themselves if further 
actions were needed to complete the crime. 
However, “some preparations may amount to 
an attempt. It is a question of degree. If the 
preparation comes very near to the accom-
plishment of the act, the intent to complete 
37 Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 64.
38 Commonwealth v. Lincoln B. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 
267, https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/su-
preme-court/volumes/177/177mass267.html.
it renders the crime so probable that the act 
will be a misdemeanor.” In this case, Holmes 
argued that the defendant was innocent 
because he did not come near enough to 
committing the arson. A punishable attempt 
required intent to complete the crime very 
soon, and at a time and place in which he 
could carry out his intentions. For Holmes, 
an example of a punishable attempt in this 
case would be if Lincoln Peaslee had been in 
the building lighting the match when he was 
caught by police.39 In Aikens v. Wisconsin,40 
two newspaper publishers were convicted of 
willfully and maliciously attempting to harm 
someone’s business by charging different 
interest rates to advertisers based on whether 
those advertisers bought advertisements in 
a third paper. Holmes applied his criminal 
attempts analysis from The Common Law 
by emphasizing the importance of the prob-
able effect of an action when he said, “The 
most innocent and constitutionally protected 
of acts or omissions may be made a step in 
a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot, 
neither its innocence nor the Constitution is 
sufficient to prevent the punishment of the 
plot by law.”41
In his Harvard Law Review article 
entitled “Privileges, Malice, and Intent,”42 
Holmes began to explore what would 
become the second element of his clear 
and present danger test: subjective intent. 
Holmes first laid out his theory of torts with 
an external test: If a person acts in a way that 
39 Commonwealth v. Lincoln B. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 
267, https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/su-
preme-court/volumes/177/177mass267.html.
40 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904), https://
caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/195/194.html.
41 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904), https://
caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/195/194.html.
42 Holmes, “Privilege, Malice, and Intent,” 1-14.
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harms another person under circumstances 
the actor knew were likely to produce that 
effect, he is liable for that harm.43 Howev-
er, Holmes explained that in some cases, 
knowingly inflicting harm on another person 
is acceptable if just cause is present.44 To 
determine whether the actor had just cause 
to harm someone else, the key factor was 
the actor’s motives. As an example, Holmes 
imagined a person who counsels another 
person to refrain from hiring a certain doctor. 
If that counsel harmed the doctor’s business, 
the person who provided that counsel might 
be liable if he gave the counsel solely to 
harm the doctor’s business, as opposed to 
believing that the doctor was unqualified to 
practice medicine. Holmes then stated his 
thesis: “If the privilege is qualified, the poli-
cy in favor of the defendant’s freedom gener-
ally will be found to be qualified only to the 
extent of forbidding him to use for the sake 
of doing harm what is allowed him for the 
sake of good.”45 In other words, a person’s 
motives determined whether a defendant 
could be liable for a privileged action that 
harmed someone else. Later in the article, 
Holmes addressed another type of tort: When 
a person’s lawful actions lead to the wrong-
doing of another person. Holmes explained 
that people have a right to expect that others 
will act lawfully, even if that expectation 
is not likely to be true. For instance, if a 
person spreads a message he heard from 
someone else, he is not responsible if that 
message turns out to be slanderous.46 How-
ever, if the conduct he attempted to induce 
in another person required tortious action 
43 Holmes, “Privilege, Malice, and Intent,” 1.
44 Holmes, “Privilege, Malice, and Intent,” 3.
45 Holmes, “Privilege, Malice, and Intent,” 6-7.
46 Holmes, “Privilege, Malice, and Intent,” 10.
(i.e. he intended to cause the tortious action), 
he is liable.47 Holmes began to apply his 
ideas on intent from “Privileges, Malice, and 
Intent” in Gandia v. Pettingill, a US Supreme 
Court case in which Holmes decided that 
the authors of news articles claiming that the 
attorney general of Puerto Rico was operat-
ing a private law practice were not libelous, 
since they were not excessive or malicious, 
and they revealed issues of great interest to 
the public.48 Holmes’s emphasis on malice 
(similar to intent) reflected his analysis in 
“Privileges, Malice, and Intent”  of liability 
for privileged conduct. Since intent is one 
of two elements Holmes emphasized in his 
clear and present danger test, and speech is 
both a privileged action and a potential cause 
of unlawful action, it appears that the princi-
ples in this article also influenced Holmes’s 
thinking on free speech in Schenck and 
Abrams.
Holmes’s academic writings and judicial 
opinions suggest that the two elements of his 
clear and present danger test originated long 
before his groundbreaking free speech opin-
ions in 1919. Even more convincing, how-
ever, are two letters Holmes wrote to other 
legal thinkers in which he further described 
his thinking on these issues. Holmes wrote 
the first letter in response to a question from 
friend and Harvard law professor Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr. On June 9, 1922, Chaffe wrote 
to Holmes asking, “whether this definition 
of freedom of speech in the Schenck case 
was at all suggested to you by any writers 
on the subject or was the result entirely of 
47 Holmes, “Privilege, Malice, and Intent,” 11.
48 Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U.S. 452 (1912). Accessed 
from https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case
=10495946766850350745&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_
vis=1&oi=scholar
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your reflections.”49 Holmes responded that 
he developed the clear and present danger 
test after several cases taught him that his 
commitment to Blackstone’s prior restraint 
doctrine of free speech was incorrect. He 
then added, “But I did think hard on the mat-
ter of attempts in my Common Law and a 
Mass [Massachusetts] case [Commonwealth 
v. Peaslee], later in the Swift case (U.S.) 
[Swift v. United States].”50 In other words, 
Holmes explicitly recognized that his crimi-
nal attempts writings found in The Common 
Law, Commonwealth v. Peaselee, and Swift 
v. United States led to his clear and pres-
ent danger test in Schenck v. United States. 
Holmes sent the second letter to an English 
friend, the jurist Sir Fredrick Pollock. In this 
letter, while commenting on his own opinion 
in Abrams v. United States, he argued that 
to constitutionally restrict speech, “an ac-
tual intent to hinder the U.S. in its war with 
Germany must be proved.” He continued, 
“even if there were evidence of a conspiracy 
to obstruct, etc., the overt act laid must be an 
act done to effect the object of the conspiracy 
and it seems to my plain that the only object 
of the leaflets was to hinder our interfer-
ence with Russia. I ought to have developed 
this in the opinion.”51 These statements 
49 Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr. to Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. (June 9, 1922), quoted in Bogen, 
“The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice 
Holmes,” 101-102.
50 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Zechari-
ah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922), quoted in Bogen, “The 
Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes,” 
101-102.
51 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Fredrick 
Pollock (December 14, 1919), in Mark De Wolfe 
Howe, ed. Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspon-
dence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pol-
lock 1874-1932, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1942), 2:32-33. https://heinonline.
org/HOL/P?h=hein.beal/holpol0002&i=1
unmistakably suggest that Holmes applied 
his thoughts from “Privileges, Malice, and 
Intent”—that liability for privileged actions 
depended upon subjective intent – to consti-
tutional freedom of speech in Abrams.
Change: How and Why Holmes Became a 
Champion of Free Speech
Though Holmes based his clear and 
present danger test on ideas from his com-
mon law writings, he did change his free 
speech viewpoints in important ways be-
fore his Schenck and Abrams opinions. One 
important change was his rejection of Black-
stone’s prior restraint idea of free speech. As 
discussed above, Blackstone’s common law 
free speech doctrine allowed civil govern-
ments to punish speech after the fact. The 
key criterion was whether the speech showed 
proximate cause—a close connection be-
tween the speech and an illegal action—to 
show that the speaker had seditious intent. 
“In practice, however, more often than not 
the rule that obtained was the bad tendency 
test. Publication and speech were held to 
be punishable if they evinced a reasonable 
tendency, at some future point, to undermine 
the government.”52 This “bad tendency test” 
gave courts significant power to limit any 
kind of speech that potentially encouraged 
opposition to the government. In Patterson v. 
United States53, in which a Colorado news-
paper Holmes interpreted the constitution’s 
freedom of speech and of the press provi-
sions in the Blackstone tradition: “the main 
purpose of such constitutional provisions is 
‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon 
52 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 511.
53 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
Accessed from http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/
usrep205/usrep205454/usrep205454.pdf.
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publications as had been practiced by other 
governments,’ and they do not prevent the 
subsequent punishment of such as may be 
deemed contrary to the public welfare.”54 In 
an unpublished dissent for Baltzer v. United 
States, the first case the Supreme Court heard 
on the Espionage Cases, Holmes still left the 
bad tendency test intact, stating, “I agree that 
freedom of speech is not abridged uncon-
stitutionally in those cases of subsequent 
punishment with which this court has from 
time to time.”55 As late as December 1918, 
Holmes still held to prior restraint (and the 
accompanying bad tendency test) to define 
constitutional freedom of speech.
Eventually, Holmes questioned and 
ultimately rejected the prior restraint doc-
trine, beginning in Schenck v. United States. 
In discussing Schenck’s constitutional free 
speech claims, Holmes stated, “It well may 
be that the prohibition of laws abridging the 
freedom of speech is not confined to previ-
ous restraints, although to prevent them may 
have been the main purpose, as intimated in 
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462.”56 
Unlike in Patterson, Holmes mentioned 
the prior restraint doctrine of free speech, 
but seemed unsure about its legitimacy and 
willing to abandon it if needed. The clear and 
present danger test, which Holmes created 
in Schenck, was effectively a method for 
54 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
Accessed from http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/
usrep205/usrep205454/usrep205454.pdf.
55 Baltzer v United States (Holmes dissenting), mem-
orandum distributed to the Justices on December 3, 
1918, quoted in Novick, “The Unrevised Holmes and 
Freedom of Expression,” 388–390. https://heinonline.
org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/suprev1991&i=307.
56 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
Accessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supreme-
court/text/249/47#writing-USSC_CR_0249_0047_
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narrowing the scope of the bad tendency test 
to only those kinds of speech that threatened 
serious, immediate attacks on the Federal 
Government or its laws. In Abrams v. United 
States several months later, Holmes went 
even further, saying, “I wholly disagree with 
the argument of the Government that the 
First Amendment left the common law as 
to seditious libel in force.”57 In other words, 
Holmes explicitly rejected the US govern-
ment’s argument that the free speech clause 
codified common law free speech doctrines. 
In 1922, Holmes openly rejected his previ-
ous adherence to the bad tendency test in a 
letter to Zechariah Chafee: “The later cases 
(and probably you-I do not remember exact-
ly) had taught me that in the earlier Paterson 
[sic] case, if that was the name of it, I had 
taken Blackstone and Parker of Mass as well 
founded, wrongly. I surely was ignorant.”58 
Holmes changed his views on free speech by 
rejecting Blackstone’s bad tendency test and 
creating the clear and present danger test. 
A second way in which Holmes’s views 
of constitutional free speech changed was in 
his increased emphasis on freedom of speech 
in his court opinions and his willingness to 
lead vocal minorities in favor of free speech. 
This pattern did not emerge in Schenck, 
likely because Holmes was assigned the 
majority opinion and wanted to encourage 
as many of his colleagues as possible to join 
it. In a letter to Fredrick Pollock, Holmes 
reflected upon Schenck and concluded, “I 
57 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
Accessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supreme-
court/text/250/616#writing-USSC_CR_0250_0616_
ZD
58 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Zechari-
ah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922), quoted in Bogen, “The 
Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes,” 
101-102.
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should go farther probably than the majority 
in favor of [free speech], and I daresay it was 
partly on that account that the C. J. assigned 
the case to me.”59 In other words, Holmes 
recognized that the Chief Justice allowed 
him to write the majority opinion in Schenck 
to force Holmes to restrain his “extreme” 
speech viewpoints. After this obstacle was 
removed, Holmes began to support free 
speech (often through dissenting opinions) 
with greater emphasis than he had before. 
One tally of Holmes’s votes on key Supreme 
Court free speech cases found that he voted 
to protect free speech in just 2 of 11 cases 
before Schenck and Abrams. By contrast, he 
voted for free speech protection in 12 of 14 
cases after Schenck and Abrams.60 Beginning 
in Abrams, Holmes also began to use his 
opinions to make sweeping defenses of his 
philosophical reasons for believing in free-
dom of speech. In Abrams, he declared:
But when men have realized that time 
has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than 
they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas—that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out. That, at any 
rate, is the theory of our Constitution. 
59 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Fredrick Pollock 
(April 5, 1919), in Howe, ed. Holmes-Pollock Letters, 
1:7.
60 Ronald K. L. Collins, The Fundamental Holmes: 
A Free Speech Chronicle and Reader, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 399.
It is an experiment, as all life is an 
experiment.61
In Gitlow v. New York in 1925, Holmes once 
again used a dissenting opinion as an op-
portunity to stand up for freedom of speech, 
saying, “It is said that this manifesto was 
more than a theory, that it was an incitement. 
Every idea is an incitement….If, in the long 
run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dic-
tatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only 
meaning of free speech is that they should be 
given their chance and have their way.”62 Be-
ginning with Abrams, Holmes showed a new 
willingness to vote for freedom of speech 
and a new eagerness to explain its philosoph-
ical backing in his Supreme Court opinions.
Two legal thinkers influenced Holmes 
to change his free speech views: Learned 
Hand and Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Hand was a 
US District Court Judge with whom Holmes 
corresponded. In 1917, Hand handed down 
an influential free speech decision in Masses 
Publishing Company v. Patten.63 In this case, 
Hand decided that the New York Postmaster 
General could not refuse to carry a maga-
zine because it criticized US involvement 
in World War I. Hand reasoned that the 
Espionage Act only prohibited people from 
encouraging others to obstruct the draft, 
and therefore the magazine in question was 
61 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
Accessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supreme-
court/text/250/616#writing-USSC_CR_0250_0616_
ZD
62 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Accessed 
from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/tex-
t/268/652#writing-USSC_CR_0268_0652_ZD
63 Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 
(S.D.N.Y.), reversed, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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legal.64 Unlike the bad tendency test popular 
at the time, Hand introduced a new test based 
on “direct incitement,” which suggesting that 
governments should fully protect nearly all 
speech, leaving only a few types unprotect-
ed.65 Shortly after writing his Masses opin-
ion, Hand discussed freedom of speech with 
Holmes during a train ride they happened to 
take together from [city] to [city] in [date]. In 
particular, Hand stated that our uncertainty 
about many of our opinions and the possibil-
ity that new insights may occur to us should 
lead us to tolerate others’ views. Apparently, 
Hand was dissatisfied with his response on 
the train to Holmes’s argument that humans 
have a “sacred right to kill the other fellow 
when he disagrees.” Hand now argued, “Not 
at all, kill him for the love of Christ and in 
the name of God, but always realize that he 
may be the saint and you the devil.”66 Possi-
bly Hand’s arguments about uncertainty as 
the ground of tolerance convinced Holmes 
to argue that “time has upset many fighting 
faiths” in support of his dissent in Abrams.67 
After Holmes published his opinions for 
Schenck and two other Espionage Cases, 
Hand objected in a letter that his opinions fo-
cused too much on intent and the likelihood 
of harm.68 Holmes’s reply made clear that he 
64 Bogen, “The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. 
Justice Holmes,” 133-134.
65 Douglas Laycock, “The Clear and Present Danger 
Test,” Journal of Supreme Court History 25, no. 2 
(2000), 163, 181. Accessed from http://supreme-
courthistory.org/assets/pub_journal_2000_vol_2.pdf
66 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. (June 22, 1918), quoted in Healy, The 
Great Dissent, 22-23.
67 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
Accessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supreme-
court/text/250/616#writing-USSC_CR_0250_0616_
ZD
68 Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (late 
March, 1919), quoted in Gerald Gunther, “Learned 
saw Hand’s “direct incitement” idea as iden-
tical to his clear and present danger test.69 In 
summary, the evidence suggests that Judge 
Learned Hand may have influenced the free 
speech views of Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
A second influence on Holmes’s free 
speech developments was Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., a law professor at Harvard University. 
Back in 1914, Holmes had subscribed to 
a new weekly magazine called The New 
Republic.70 After Hand’s Masses opinion in 
1917, Chafee used the summer of 1918 to 
study the appropriate boundary between free 
speech and speech the federal government 
could restrict.71 After Holmes’s first Espio-
nage Act opinions (including Schenck) were 
published, Chafee wrote an article for the 
New Republic in November 1919. In this 
article, Chafee attacked Holmes’s decisions 
in the Espionage Cases for violating the First 
Amendment. Chafee argued that the First 
Amendment protected wartime opposition 
to the government as long as the opposition 
did not directly cause dangerous opposition 
to the war.72 In a 1919 Harvard Law Review 
article entitled “Free Speech During War-
Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History,” Stanford 
Law Review 27, no. 3 (February 1975): 758-759. 
Accessed from https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.
journals/stflr27&i=737
69 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Learned Hand 
(April, 1919), quoted in Gunther, “Learned Hand and 
the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine,” 
759-760.
70 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Fredrick Pollock 
(November 7, 1914), in Howe, ed. Holmes-Pollock 
Letters, 1:223-224.
71 Ragan, “Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zech-
ariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger 
Test for Free Speech,” 37.
72 Ragan, “Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zech-
ariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger 
Test for Free Speech,” 38.
34
time,” Chafee argued that the purpose of the 
First Amendment was to allow all people to 
express their viewpoints, thereby further-
ing the search for truth. He argued that the 
government could only ban types of speech 
that came close enough to inciting illegal 
actions, and severely criticized Holmes by 
name.73 In a 1922 letter, Holmes answered 
Chafee’s question about how he developed 
the clear and present danger test by saying, 
“The expression that you refer to was not 
helped by any book that I know-I think it 
came without doubt after the later cases (and 
probably you-I do not remember exactly) 
had taught me…”74 In other words, Holmes 
explicitly recognized that Chafee likely influ-
enced him to reject the common law, prior 
restraint-based idea of free speech in favor of 
his clear and present danger test. Given Cha-
fee’s criticisms of Holmes and Holmes’s own 
statements, it is likely that Chafee helped 
change Holmes’s free speech ideas. 
Clear and Present Danger After Holmes
In the 1930s and 1940s, a more civil 
liberties-conscious Supreme Court accepted 
Holmes’s clear and present danger test and 
expanded its applicability beyond internal 
security issues. In Whitney v. California, 
Holmes’s longtime Supreme Court colleague 
Louis Brandeis further developed the clear 
and present danger test that Holmes had 
created.75 In his opinion, Brandeis explained 
that speech must threaten clear, imminent, 
73 Ragan, “Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zech-
ariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger 
Test for Free Speech,” 41-42.
74 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Zechari-
ah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922), quoted in Bogen, “The 
Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes,” 
101-102.
75 Collins, The Fundamental Holmes, 355.
and serious danger before the government 
could restrict it under the clear and present 
danger test.76 The Court that would apply 
this version of the test was more committed 
to freedom of speech than previous Supreme 
Courts had been. President Franklin Roos-
evelt appointed several justices who support-
ed expanded civil liberties (often including 
freedom of speech), including Benjamin 
Cardozo (1932), Hugo Black (1937), Wil-
liam O. Douglas (1939), Felix Frankfurter 
(1939), Frank Murphey (1940), and Wiley 
Rutledge (1943).77 Combined with Brandeis 
and Harlan Fiske Stone, this gave civil 
liberties a majority on the Court by 1940.78 
This newly-composed Court began to apply 
the clear and present danger test to a wider 
scope of issues than the internal security is-
sues Holmes had originally used the test for. 
For instance, Bridges v. California (decided 
in 1941) reversed the conviction of labor 
agitator Harry Bridges and the editors of the 
Los Angeles Times for contempt of court by 
publishing about pending state court cases. 
The Supreme Court found that the dangers 
the speech threatened were not serious, and 
therefore the state could not restrict that 
speech under the clear and present danger 
test.79 West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette (decided in 1943) struck down 
a law that prohibited school children from 
refusing to salute the American flag. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Robert H. Jackson 
declared that refusing to salute the flag did 
76 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
Accessed from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supreme-
court/text/274/357#writing-USSC_CR_0274_0357_
ZC
77 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, front 
matter.
78 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 520.
79 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 531.
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not constitute a clear and present danger to 
the United States.80 Through cases like these, 
the newly-configured Supreme Court of the 
1930s and 1940s expanded the reach of the 
clear and present danger test.
In the 1950s, the Cold War encouraged 
a return to suppressing speech that criticized 
the government and brought about a land-
mark case that led to the death of the clear 
and present danger test. After the discovery 
of several Communist spies working to 
sabotage the United States, the free speech 
of American Communists became a hotly 
debated topic. Free speech libertarians used 
the spirit of Holmes’s opinions—particular-
ly his “marketplace of ideas” concept from 
Abrams—to argue for the Communists’ right 
to speak. Conversely, free speech conser-
vatives who opposed complete freedom of 
speech for Communists argued that the clear 
and present danger test could show when 
restricting Communist speech rights was ap-
propriate.81 The debate culminated in Dennis 
v. United States, a 1951 Supreme Court case 
addressing the convictions of twelve Ameri-
can Communist party leaders. To decide this 
case, the Court had to consider whether the 
Communist party itself taught ideas suffi-
ciently dangerous to the United States to 
warrant restricting its leaders’ free speech. 
While he invoked Holmes’s clear and pres-
ent danger test, Chief Justice Fred Vinson 
reinterpreted it to fit his argument to convict 
the Communist leaders. Specifically, Vinson 
argued that the Court must weigh the seri-
ousness of the threat against the likelihood of 
the threat occurring. If the threat was serious 
enough, governments could constitution-
80 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 530.
81 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 560.
ally restrict it, even if it the illegal conduct 
the speech advocated was very unlikely to 
happen.82 Dennis destroyed the usefulness of 
the clear and present danger test by turning 
several justices against the test and turning 
it into a “sliding scale” instead of imminent 
danger and subjective intent. At the same 
time, the Court could not overrule Dennis 
in an effort to reclaim the test because of 
popular support for Dennis’s anti-Communist 
ruling. As a result, the Court had to abandon 
the clear and present danger test and find a 
new method of finding the limits of constitu-
tional free speech.83
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court devel-
oped the “Imminent Lawlessness” test to 
replace the clear and present danger test. The 
liberal Supreme Court under Earl Warren in 
the 1960s finally brought about the triumph 
of libertarian views of free speech on internal 
security issues. This triumph happened large-
ly because of the decline in anti-Communist 
fear in Americans in the late 1950s, and 
because new Supreme Court justices Arthur 
Goldberg and Abe Fortas (appointed in the 
early 1960s) gave the libertarians on the 
Court a majority.84 In Brandenburg v. Ohio 
(1969), the Court struck down an Ohio stat-
ute under which the state convicted a mem-
ber of the Ku Klux Klan [of what]. In this 
case, the Court overruled Whitney v. Califor-
nia, formally nullifying the clear and present 
danger test. The new imminent lawlessness 
test took the “present danger” element of the 
CPD test and combined it with “incitement” 
from Learned Hand’s Masses opinion during 
World War I. The result was a test that al-
82 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 571.
83 Laycock, “The Clear and Present Danger Test,” 
179-181.
84 Kelly et. all, The American Constitution, 574.
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lowed the state to prohibit and punish a few 
types of speech while completely protecting 
most types of speech. This signified a clear 
break with the clear and present danger test, 
which attempted to balance individual rights 
and state interests.85 Though Brandenburg 
rejected Holmes’s test, it arguably vindicated 
his philosophy of free speech. As legal schol-
ar Robert Bork has noted:
The law of free speech we know 
today grows out of the Supreme 
Court decisions following World War 
I – Schenck v. United States, Abrams 
v. United States, Gitlow v. New York, 
Whitney v. California – not out of the 
majority positions but rather from the 
opinions, mostly dissents or concur-
rences that were really dissents, of 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis….The 
great Smith Act cases of the 1950’s, 
Dennis v. United States, as modified 
by Yates v. United States, and, more 
recently, in 1969, Brandenburg v. 
Ohio (voiding the Ohio criminal syn-
dicalism statute), mark the triumph of 
Holmes and Brandeis.86 
Though the 1960s Supreme Court reject-
ed the test in Brandenburg, it built upon 
Holmes’s first steps toward a broader view of 
free speech. 
In summary, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. changed the face of constitutional free 
speech in the United States while showing 
85 Laycock, “The Clear and Present Danger Test,” 
179-181.
86 Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems,” Indiana Law Journal 47, no. 
1 (Fall 1971): 23, https://www.repository.law.indiana.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2720&context=ilj.
both change and continuity in his free speech 
views. Holmes’s legal training caused him 
to accept the traditional bad tendency inter-
pretation of the Constitution’s free speech 
clause, but his Civil War experience encour-
aged a skeptical mindset that was willing 
to consider alternative approaches. On one 
hand, his common law writings on criminal 
attempts and liability for privileged conduct 
shaped his interpretation of the Free Speech 
Clause. On the other hand, only the Espio-
nage Cases convinced Holmes to abandon 
the common law bad tendency test in favor 
of his own clear and present danger test. Not 
until even later, in Abrams v. United States, 
did Holmes begin to openly champion free 
speech and write dissents in favor of unpop-
ular speakers. Holmes’s clear and present 
danger test expanded beyond internal securi-
ty to other areas of free speech before facing 
its downfall during the Cold War in Dennis v. 
United States. Though Brandenburg v. Ohio 
nullified the test in 1969, the new imminent 
lawlessness test retained Holmes’s basic 
principle of protecting speech that was un-
popular but not seriously dangerous. Though 
Holmes is known as one of the greatest legal 
thinkers in American history for his many 
contributions to American law, his contribu-
tions to free speech may be his most import-
ant accomplishment. His clear and present 
danger test changed the direction of Ameri-
can free speech jurisprudence and introduced 
the expansive free speech rights found in 
modern constitutional law.
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